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ABSTRACT 
The present paper deals with the relationship between modality and evidentiality, 
focussed specifically on the use of the expression I think in combination with other modal 
devices, as well as the possible pragmatic effects observed in text samples obtained from 
the Coruña Corpus of English Scientific Writing and whether the variable of discipline might 
have some effect on the functions the expression represents in these texts. Even if much 
research is still to be done in academic texts from a diachronic perspective, there are 
some previous studies on stance devices carried out within the arena of historical 
pragmatics (cf. Gray, Biber and Hiltunen 2011; Moskowich and Crespo 2014; Alonso-
Almeida 2015; Álvarez-Gil 2017, 2018, 2019). Following this tradition, we focus on the 
expression I think, following the work of van der Auwera and Plungian (1998) for the 
description of modality and modal types.. 
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1. Introduction 
In the present paper, we analyse the uses and functions of the evidential expression I think in 
two subcorpora of the Coruña Corpus of English Scientific Writing, specifically, The Corpus of History 
English Texts (CHET) and The Corpus of English Texts on Astronomy (CETA). The texts compiled at 
the Universidade A Coruña (Spain) by the MuStE Research Group belong to the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. The objective of selecting those two corpora is to show whether there are 
disciplinary differences in the use and communicative functions of this structure in the period of 
the English language comprising the two centuries just mentioned. In our inspection of the 
occurrences found, we also take into consideration the linguistic context in which this specific 
form appears embedded. This means especially the syntactic context since it has relevant effects 
on the way in which I think should be interpreted.  
Our interpretation of findings follows from earlier literature in the domain of modality and 
evidentiality studies and other linguistic related concepts such as commitment, mitigation or 
politeness, among others (cf. Aikhenvald, 2004; Alonso-Almeida, 2012 and 2015a, 2015b; Alonso-
Almeida and Álvarez-Gil, 2019; Besnard, 2017; Besnard, 2017; Brown and Levinson, 1987; 
Burkhardt, 2010; Chafe, 1986; Coates, 1985, 1987; Cornillie, 2009; Cornillie and Delbecque, 2008; 
De Brabanter and Dendale, 2008; Diewald and Smirnova, 2010; Fujii, 2010; Marín Arrese, 2017; 
Narrog, 2012; Palmer, 1976, 1986; Schneider, 2010; Von Fintel, 2006; Willet, 1988). Our notion of 
stance is based on the readings of Du Bois (2007), Hyland (2005), Stubbs (1983) and Lorenz 
(1999), among others. 
After the description of our theoretical framework, we will present a description of the work 
corpus and of the methodology used. The methodology for analysis includes computer tools in 
order to detect, count and excerpt cases of I think along with convenient context for a thorough 
understanding of I think in use. This is material for manual inspection in order to evaluate the 
pragmatic communicative functions. At this stage, reading backwards and forwards in the texts 
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RESUMEN 
Este trabajo trata sobre la relación entre modalidad y evidencialidad. Está centrado 
específicamente en el uso de la expresión I think en combinación con otros elementos 
modales, así como los posibles efectos pragmáticos observados en muestras de textos 
obtenidas del Coruña Corpus of English Scientific Writing. Asimismo, analizamos si la variable 
de disciplina podría tener algún efecto sobre las funciones que la expresión lleva a cabo 
en estos textos. Aunque todavía queda mucho por investigar en textos académicos desde 
una perspectiva diacrónica, hay algunos estudios previos sobre elementos de 
posicionamiento realizados en el ámbito de la pragmática histórica (cf. Gray, Biber y 
Hiltunen 2011; Moskowich and Crespo 2014; Alonso-Almeida 2015; Álvarez-Gil, 2017, 
2018, 2019). Siguiendo esta tradición, nos centramos en la expresión I think, siguiendo el 
trabajo de van der Auwera y Plungian (1998) para la descripción de la modalidad y los 
tipos modales. 
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may be fundamental to capture the writers’ intentions. This analysis allows the discussion of 
findings preceding the conclusion section of this paper.  
2. Literature review 
2.1. Stance  
The concept of stance seems to be considered by many scholars as a linguistic phenomenon, 
which “has not yet been fully explored” (Lorenz, 1999, p. 5). In fact, it is a complex linguistic notion 
whose function is to signal authorial attitudes. It seems to be universal in language, as it seems 
to be practically nothing that a speaker can convey without showing some sort of attitude. Stubbs 
(1983, p. 1) argues that 
Whenever speakers (or writers) say anything, they encode their point of view towards it: whether 
they think it is a reasonable thing to say, or might be found to be obvious, questionable, tenta-
tive, provisional, controversial, contradictory, irrelevant, impolite, or whatever. The expression of 
such speakers’ attitudes is pervasive in all uses of language. All sentences encode such a point of 
view, […] and the description of the markers for such points of view and their meanings should 
therefore be a central topic for linguistics. 
The concept has been analysed from diverse standpoints, but there is no scholarly consensus as 
to the exact extent of its scope. In this study, we will follow Hyland’s definition, which stands that 
stance “can be seen as an attitudinal dimension and includes features which refer to the ways 
writers present themselves and convey their judgements, opinions and commitments. It is the 
way that writers intrude to stamp their personal authority onto their arguments or step back and 
disguise their involvement” (Hyland, 2005, p. 176). 
Other relevant works dealing with the analysis of stance include Du Bois (2007) and Hyland and 
Tse (2004). When analysing stancetaking in dialogic discourse, Du Bois (2007, p. 163) refers to the 
“stance triangle”. The author claims that any act of stancetaking comprises three basic features, 
namely (i) evaluation, (ii) positioning and (iii) alignment, in other words, that when we take a 
stance, we evaluate a determined object, as well as we position ourselves in an evaluative 
dimension regarding that object; and lastly, we also align ourselves with others. In a similar way, 
Hyland and Tse (2004) divide the features involved in an evaluative construction into at least four 
elements, i.e. the evaluated entity, the evaluative stance, the source of the evaluation and the 
evaluative expression itself. 
In these definitions, Du Bois (2007) and Hyland’s and Tse’s (2004), the key aspect that both have 
in common is the evaluative dimension of the notion of stance. In general, stance can be 
understood as the way in which speakers appraise people, objects and ideas, and it also covers 
self-evaluation, as Alonso-Almeida (2015b, p. 1) claims. Evaluation is defined by Hunston and 
Thompson (2000, p. 5), as follows: 
evaluation is the broad cover term for the expression of the speaker or writer’s attitude or stance 
towards, viewpoint on, or feelings about the entities or propositions that he or she is talking 
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about. That attitude may relate to certainty or obligation or desirability or any of a number of 
other sets of values. When appropriate, we refer specifically to modality as a sub-category of eva-
luation. 
In relation to evaluative language, authors can decide to include diverse linguistics elements, in 
order to express their opinions, both, positive or negative, in relation to the propositional 
content. Among the linguistic devices, which are normally employed to transmit these 
interpersonal meaning, probably the most common ones are adjectives, adverbs and modal 
verbs.  
2.2. Modality 
Modality is a linguistic category, which deals with the potentiality for a given situation to be 
eligible to be true in the present, the past or the future. This linguistic domain is intrinsically 
connected to the field of modal logic which has been defined by Davies (1997, p. 336) as "the 
logic of necessity and possibility- intuitively, of the ways things must be, and the ways things 
might have been" and whose means of expression are characterised by its great dependence on 
the use of devices conveying modality.  
2.2.1. Subcategories of modality 
Scholars do not agree in which concerns to the categorisation of modality; therefore, the 
categories vary according to the linguist. We follow Nuyts’ taxonomy (2016), which is focussed on 
three main subcategories, below, namely: 
• Deontic modality constitutes the subcategory of modality, which deals with the expression of necessity, 
and possibility from the standpoint of a pre-existing system (e.g. social constructions, religious systems, 
'common sense') with a particular set of norms of its own. This category is described by Nuyts (2016, p. 
36) as "an indication of the degree of moral desirability of the state of affairs expressed in the utterance, 
typically but not necessarily on behalf of the speaker. […] this definition should be taken widely: it 
involves 'societal norms' as well as personal 'ethical' criteria of the person responsible for the deontic 
assessment". In this sense, the expression of ideas such as personal expectations, desires, 
permissibility or obligation is also liable to fall into this category. 
• Dynamic modality has been given a wide array of different designations amongst which we can find 
'neutral', 'facultative', or 'inherent modality'. Some other authors may even divide it into two different 
subcategories. A proposition may fall into the domain of dynamic modality when its condition of 
necessity and possibility depends directly on a previously given set of circumstances, or factors, which 
may be 'subject-internal' or external, e.g. the speaker's ability to perform the action which is being 
described in their clause. 
• Finally, epistemic modality, which, along with evidentiality, will be the essential concepts for the purpose 
of this paper. Faller (2006: 1) defines epistemic modality as "the marking of the speaker's degree of 
certainty and/ or the necessity/possibility of the truth of the propositional content". Later on, and 
following a similar reasoning, Nuyts and van der Auwera (2016, p. 38) describe it as "an estimation, […] 
typically but not necessarily by the speaker, of the chances or the likelihood that the state of affairs 
expressed in the clause applies in the world".  
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In this context, epistemic modality can be understood as a subcategory of linguistic modality 
involved in the speaker's evaluation and expression of the likelihood for a hypothetical situation, 
with its own particulars, to be eligible to take place in a present, or future case scenario, as well 
as the chances of it having occurred in the past. This evaluation judgement will often be carried 
out with regard to the speakers’ knowledge of the world, in other words, what speakers think 
they know, and the degree of trust towards the source for their information. In the same way, 
this evaluation, or estimation, appears to be carried out by following a sort of gradation system, 
as highlighted by Nuyts and van der Auwera (2016, p. 38), since the devices involved in expressing 
epistemic modality operate almost on a scalar basis "from absolute certainty, via probability to 
fairly neutral possibility that the state of affairs is real". 
2.3. Evidentiality 
The concept of evidentiality has been largely discussed amongst scholars without having reached 
a consensus as to its scope. Therefore, there exist scholars that claim it should be considered as 
a separate linguistic category in its own, or rather, as a sub-domain of the concept of epistemic 
modality, as Alonso-Almeida (2015a, p. 390) points out. In the present work, we follow the 
standpoint that considers that 'evidentiality', on its own, embodies a whole new category distinct 
from that of epistemic modality. Though, sometimes, depending on the diverse communicative 
contexts, they can experience functional overlapping.   
Within the field of pragmatics, evidentiality can be understood as the set of linguistic 
mechanisms involved in expressing the source of information from which the speaker has 
obtained the information to formulate the specific propositional content he or she expresses, as 
well as the way in which the information has been attained. In fact, the conveyance of the notion 
of 'source of knowledge' is usually achieved by means of linguistic strategies other than 
grammatical evidentiality. Usually, these strategies follow lexical schemes involving locutions, 
clauses, or one-word adverbs in order to create the same effect.  
According to Aikhenvald (2004, p. 10), the lexical means employed by a speaker of a language 
lacking grammatical evidentiality can include "different statuses", or categories, for example; 
verbs or verb centred introductory clauses such as, I hear, I think, I guess, they say, I hear that, it 
seems to me that, or allege; or adverbs such as allegedly, or reportedly. In fact, the analysis of 
evidentiality in languages such as English or Spanish frequently arises terminological as well as 
analytical disagreement amongst scholars. In this context, Aikhenvald (2004) also points out that 
in the particular case of the English language cannot be said to present evidentiality, or at least 
not grammaticalized evidentiality. Instead, it could be said that it does present pragmatic 
evidentiality:  
Saying that English parentheticals are 'evidentials' is akin saying that time words like 'yesterday' 
and 'today' are tense markers. These expressions are not obligatory and do not constitute a 
grammatical category; consequently, they are only tangential to the present discussion. Saying 
English has 'evidentiality' (cf. Fox 2001) is misleading: this implies a confusion between what is 
grammaticalized and what is lexical in a language (Aikhenvald, 2004, p. 10). 
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With regards to the relationship between the concepts of epistemic modality and evidentiality, 
this last  one can be classify into three different categories, namely: inclusive, intersective and 
disjunctive. In the case of the inclusive type, epistemic modality is considered as a subcategory 
of epistemic modality, and thus evidentials evaluate the possibilities that one specific proposition 
has to be true. The intersective approach makes reference to a sort of continuum between 
degrees of certainty concerning the actualization of the proposition based on the evaluation of 
the evidences a determined speaker has to claim that the propositional content is the it is 
affirmed. In this same line, Van der Auwera and Plungian (1998) underline the notion of evidential 
inferentiality, which advocates the intersective relationship between epistemic necessity and 
inference. An instance that exemplifies this can be Ask Rachel. She must know the answer. In this 
example, the epistemic modal verb must indicates the speaker’s inference in the light of the 
contextual premises selected. This intersective perspective is found in Diewald et al. (2009:190): 
“Evidentiality is concerned with indicating the information source the speaker is relying on to 
make a claim. This places this category next to epistemic modality without, however, merging 
them into one”. Finally, the third category is the disjunctive one, which contemplates evidentiality 
as a category on its own. This conception of evidentiality is followed in Cornillie (2009) and 
Alonso-Almeida (2015a).  
The disjunctive perspective basically states that evidentials inform on the speaker’s involvement 
to claim a specific propositional content rather than on the evaluation of chances of this content 
to be true. Generally, the assessment of a given proposition in terms of truth is performed on 
the evaluation of the evidential. In this vein, following Willet (1988), first hand, in other words, 
visual and auditory evidence is said to be more reliable than third hand (hearsay, reported) 
evidence and inferential meaning. This interpretation has been challenged in Alonso-Almeida 
(2015b), paper in which the author claims that evaluation of source of knowledge does not 
necessarily entail different degrees of propositional truth. 
3. Corpus description and methodology 
The Coruña Corpus of English Scientific Writing (henceforth CC) has been developed by the 
Research Group for Multidimensional Corpus-Based Studies in English (MuStE). All the different 
subcorpora of the CC tend to have an average of 40 text samples, and around 400,000 words 
each. All the texts included in this compilation belong to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
In this sense, it can be said that the main scope of this corpus, in terms of linguistic periods, is 
the study of scientific texts belonging to the Late Modern English period. During this period, 
many changes took place in social, cultural and political spheres including: science, philosophy, 
economy, technology; all these changes affecting the language of the period to some extent.  
For this reason, the academic community enjoyed a new burst of interest for language, as well 
as concern for the supposed limitations of English and its purity. This brought with it the 
proliferation of an extensive bibliography of grammar writings, and dictionaries which sought to 
bring some order to the 'chaos of language'. Similarly, the improvements and new discoveries of 
this period needed of a more fixed and formulaic scientific wording so as to reach all audiences 
within the academic community.  
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In this study, we work with two of the subcorpora, which are part of the Coruña Corpus, namely: 
the Corpus of English Texts on Astronomy (CETA) and the Corpus of History English Texts (CHET). 
Table 1 illustrates the texts distribution per century and the number of texts belonging to each 
century in both subcorpora.   
Subcorpus  Number of texts Number of words 
 
CETA 
18th century 21 208.079 
19th century 21 201.830 
 
CHET 
18th century 20 201.794 
19th century 20 202.823 
Table 1. Number of words and texts per century in each of the two subcorpora 
The genres in CC (cf. Moskowich, 2017b) have been distributed into eight groups corresponding 
to different categories: treatises, essays, textbooks, letters, lectures, articles, dialogues, and 
others. Moskowich (2011, p. 182) clarifies that this classification is not based merely on linguistic 
features, but also on other aspects, such as epistemological features, social factors and the 
authors’ purposes, for instance (also in Crespo, 2012). In Figure 1, the distribution of texts per 
genre category in both subcorpora are given: 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of words per genre in CETA and CHET 
4. Results and analysis 
Our analysis focuses on the contrastive study of the use, frequency and function of the linguistic 
structure I think in scientific texts written in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. The 
number of occurrences of the expression I think raises to the total of 52 cases; 23 of these tokens 
belong to CHET, while the examples in CETA amount to 29 tokens. In this case, the majority of 
the samples found belong to the eighteenth century, as can be seen from the graphic below.  
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Figure 2. Distribution of words per genre in CETA and CHET 
Concerning the pragmatic functions, out of those 52 cases of this item the 86.54% express 
politeness, while the other 13.46% of the occurrences indicate involvement or convey cognitive 
or conceptual-procedural meaning. In most of the cases the conveyance of real commitment is 
achieved thanks to the support of other linguistic elements, these usually being modal such as 
in the case of I think is highly probable, but also through other structures namely, agentless 
passive phrases, intersubjective strategies, among others. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Occurrences conveying epistemic modality in CETA and CHET 
In the case of CETA we find that 24.14% of the occurrences present epistemic modality as well as 
evidentiality [see figure 3]; while in CHET, this percentage rises up to 43.48% [see figure 3]. This 
seems to indicate that in samples belonging to the field of history the conceptualizers appear to 
be more prone to specifying their own personal attitudes, as well as their assessments with 
respect to their propositions so as to justify any possible variation or mistake.  
5. Discussion of the results 
The Collins Dictionary explains the use of the hedge I think as follows:  
a. You use 'I think' as a way of being polite when you are explaining or suggesting to someone what you 
want to do, or when you are accepting or refusing an offer. [politeness] 
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b. You use 'I think' in conversations or speeches to make your statements and opinions sound less 
forceful, rude, or direct. [vagueness]  
In definition b, the notion of vagueness coincides with that of politeness in the pragmatic sense 
as dealt with in the course of this work. In this sense, it comes as no surprise that most of the 
occurrences that will be presented here represent examples of face-saving acts showing 
negative politeness. 
(1) I think, however, that there are other arguments, also drawn from scientific discoveries, which bear, in 
a very important and striking manner, upon the opinions in question, and which Chalmers has not 
referred to […] (Whewell 1858) [CETA] 
(2) THAT, Madam, is called the  Celeſtial one, ſaid I, becauſe 'tis deſigned for a  Representation of the 
Firmament, and the Concave Arch of the Heavens; and indeed it doth well enough exhibit to us the  
fixed Stars, and the Tracks or Circles of the Sun and Planets apparent Motions, if you get a right Notion 
of it, as this Figure, which we call an Armillary Sphere, will I think help you to obtain: In order to which 
you muſt now imagine your Eye placed within at the Center of the Globe […] (Harris 1719) [CETA] 
(3) I only farther add, that [Mr]. Gordon in his account of his Galgacan camp takes no notice, I think, of a 
ſtone that is in the middle of it, a tumulus nigh it, and a military way that goes from it; and in computing 
its contents, omits the legions, and the four alae, that were kept as a reſerve: for the auxiliaries alone 
were eight thouſand, and the horſe on the wings were three thouſand. (Horsley 1732) [CHET] 
Examples (1) and (2) belong to CETA whilst, (3) belongs to CHET. All these occurrences represent 
cases of negative politeness in appositive position, for their only purpose is that of downtoning 
the strength of the proposition so it is not perceived as an imposition. Occurrences (4), (5) and 
(6), below, seem to convey mitigation of claim:   
(4) I SEE it is, ſaid the Lady, and I believe I ſee alſo the Reaſon why it muſt be ſo; for it is juſt as far ([viz]. 90°) 
from the Equator to the Pole, as from the Zenith to the Horizon; ſo that taking away the middle Part, 
which is common to both, the Latitude of any Place, and the  Height of the Pole above its Horizon are 
all one in Quantity; and ſo I ſuppoſe 'tis called the  Height of the Pole, becauſe the  Pole Star, which is 
near the Polar Point (as I think you told me) will appear, in the Night, juſt ſo high above the Horizon of 
any Place, as is that Place's Latitude. (Harris 1719) [CETA] 
(5) I THINK I underſtand you; ſaid ſhe, the Figure of a Globe is not flattiſh like that of a Cheeſe or a common 
Ninepin-Bowl; but rather like a Boy's Marble, or a Bullet caſt in a Mould. (Harris 1719) [CETA] 
(6) Three of the comets have had their periods settled, as near the truth as could be expected, yet not, I 
think, permanently so. The first of these is that which appeared in 1532, 1607, 1682, 1759, which I have 
before mentioned; the latter appearance of which did not exactly answer to the foregoing periods: —
should it in future conform to either, its period being supposed about 75 years, we may expect its 
return in 1834. (Bryan 1797) [CETA] 
Due to the communicative contexts in which this expression is inserted, in the examples (4) and 
(5) from CETA listed above, it can be interpreted that the author, or the speaker as it is meant to 
resemble a dialogue between a man and a woman, seems to be doubtful about her having 
understood well. For this reason, she uses the hedge I think as a means of presenting the 
information only as her perspective so that she cannot be held responsible in case the 
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propositional content was inaccurate. However, it cannot be claimed this indicates in any way 
the speaker’s own assessment of the possibilities for that scenario being true.  
In example (6), on the other hand, although the primary function is that of reducing the strength 
of the proposition in order to perform an example of negative politeness, in this case, one could 
say that the author is also presenting the information as a perspective of the truth detach himself 
from the responsibility for the prediction, independently of his own appraisal of the actual 
possibilities of that being the case. This idea is reinforced with the fact that he expresses that the 
predictions have been erroneous in the past.  
Except for the examples (4), (5) and (6), which show that this epistemic lexical item can sometimes 
be used as well to imply lack of commitment to some degree, the great majority of cases depict 
the hedge I think functioning in combination with other epistemic modality devices to show 
varying degrees of commitment, and/ or the potentiality for the propositional content expressed 
to be eligible for being true.  
(7) AGRICOLA left Britain, before Cerialis reſigned to Frontinus. This, I think, is highly probable, becauſe 
the hiſtorian ſo expreſſly mentions his ſerving under Cerialis, but ſays nothing of his being under 
Frontinus. (Horseley 1732) [CHET] 
(8) But I think it is extremely probable that, in some of its stages, the nebula had a very much higher 
temperature than that now possessed by the sun. (Croll 1889) [CETA] 
In (7) and (8), we can observe that I think works to mitigate the strength of the proposition so as 
to stop it from being perceived as too direct, or inconsiderate, with respect to the readers' 
expectations. Therefore, in these examples just like in the previous instances presented in this 
section, I think is used as a negative politeness strategy to protect the face of the interlocutor. 
The difference in this case, lies in the addition of the modal expression 'is highly probable', or 
'extremely probable' in the case of (8), which shows both; the authors’ appraisal of the 
possibilities of their statement being true; and their full commitment to the propositional content 
which they have purposely decided to highlight through their choice of intensifying the modal 
adjective 'probable' with the adverbs 'highly' and 'extremely'.   
In the following examples, we can find I think in combination with other modality devices and 
showing different effects:  
(9) But, I think, it may be questioned, whether, to produce such doubts, is a common or probable effect 
of an acquaintance with astronomical discoveries. [Whewell 1858] (CETA) 
(10)  Taking all things into consideration, it is, I think, obvious that the average rate of denudation since 
the beginning of Palæozoic times was probably not much greater than at the present day. [ Croll 1889] 
(CETA) 
(11)  [...] unleſs it ſhould appear plainly, that the people were excluded from having any ſhare, in the enſuing 
eleƈtions of ſenators, I think, we may very fairly preſume, that they continued to exerciſe the ſame 
right, in every ſubſequent inſtance, which we have already ſhewn them to have done, in the firſt. 
[Chapman 1750] (CHET) 
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(12)  From them, I think, it is evident, that the eleƈtion of the ſenate as related above from Dionyſius of 
Halicarnaſſus, was conduƈted with all the formality, required by the fundamental laws of the Roman 
conſtitution [Chapman 1750] (CHET) 
In all of the occurrences above, namely (9), (10), (11) and (12), I think keeps bearing the role of 
expressing negative politeness towards the potential readers by presenting the information as 
a perspective. However, the elements, which accompany them, are the ones, which slightly 
modify its pragmatic effect. In (9), for instance, we find the modal expression it may. The choice 
of using this expression shows the author's desire not to be perceived as excessively direct. For 
this reason, he seems to present the information as a mere estimation.  
In the same way, it may could also fall into the category subjective implicit, presented by Marín 
Arrese (2011), as the 'conceptualizer' seems to be present in the proposition although it is never 
explicitly highlighted. In the same vein, occurrence (11) constitutes an example of an 
'intersubjective explicit' mood. In this case, the author chooses to present the mitigating modal 
verb may following the first person plural pronoun, we. This indicates that the responsibility for 
the estimation is shared between himself and the potential reader so as to take part of it off his 
own shoulders as well as to reduce the force of the statement in order to show negative 
politeness. Nevertheless, in spite of using all these mitigating strategies to frame the proposition, 
the fact that the author continues with the adverbial cluster 'very fairly presume' suggests that 
the speaker is actually committed to the truth of his statement to a high degree. Lastly, 
occurrences (10) and (12) are examples of an 'intersubjective opaque' speaker since the 
conceptualizer is neither explicitly pointed at, nor is he suggested. Rather, the role of the 
conceptualizer remains somewhat 'virtual'.  
6. Conclusions 
The study performed on our corpus of late Modern English scientific texts demonstrates that the 
function of evidential I think is to show politeness in discourse. The presence of this device allows 
reducing the strength of the illocutionary force of the proposition it frames to avoid potential 
face-threats. For the same reason, I think also appears to be used with the intention of protecting 
the positive face of the writer by attenuating the strength of the commitment to the truth of what 
is being said. Epistemic I think seems to contribute towards the expression of either negative or 
positive politeness. In general, this device is deployed to safeguard the writers’ own public faces, 
while they also care for their audience’s face. 
From a register perspective, our findings reveal that the number of I think in history texts, either 
alone or in combination with other modal devices, almost doubles those identified in the 
astrology texts. This tendency may arise from the fact that historians obtain their information 
from their reading-around of the available material used as source of evidence. From here, they 
elaborate the information included in their texts, and so I think appears to be tremendously 
useful to suggest both the cognitive nature of the information given and the author’s position.  
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